This paper investigates the relation between the ownership structure, valuation and performance of Brazilian companies. The results show that large shareholders keep control while holding only a small fraction of cash flow rights. The evidence also indicates that non-voting shares and pyramiding are the main devices set to entrench the large controlling shareholder. There is some evidence that firm valuation and performance are negatively related to voting concentration, and that foreignowned firms perform the best while government-owned firms perform the worst.
Introduction
Recent studies (Shleifer and Vishny (1997) The presence of controlling shareholders may be harmful to the firm because their interests may not align with those of non-controlling shareholders. The power of the controlling shareholders to expropriate outside investors is moderated by their financial incentives not to do so. An important source of such inventives is equity or cash flow ownership by the controlling shareholder. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that concentrated ownership may be beneficial for corporate valuation, because large investors are better at monitoring managers. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) distinguish between the negative control effects and the positive incentive effects of high stakes of ownership, and point out that the separation between ownership and control increases the conflicts of interest and thus decreases firm valuation.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), La Porta et al. (1998, 2000, 2002) , and Claessens et al. (2002) suggest that greater cash flow rights are associated with greater valuation. In contrast, concentration of control rights and the separation of voting from cash flow rights have a negative effect on firm value. When large investors control a corporation, their policies may result in the expropriation of minority shareholders. Such companies are unnattractive to small shareholders and their shares have lower valuation. This paper expands the existing literature on ownership and control structure in Brazil , Leal et Our results show that large shareholders keep most voting rights (control) while holding only a small fraction of cash flow rights (ownership). Nonvoting shares and pyramiding are the main devices set to entrench the large controlling shareholder. Furthermore, there is some evidence that firm valuation and performance are negatively related to voting concentration, and that foreign-owned firms perform the best while government-owned firms perform the worst.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data and methodology. Section 3 presents the empirical results for the direct and indirect shareholding structures as well as the evidence on their effect on firm valuation and performance. Section 4 concludes.
Data and Methodology
Our sample includes the companies listed on the São Paulo stock exchange (Bovespa) in 2002. We excludes companies with incomplete or unavailable information and with negative book value of assets, negative book value of common equity and firms that had no trade on the Sao Paulo stock exchange during the sample period. The final sample consists of 214 firms, which represent 54% of the number of listed companies and 67% of the market capitalization.
Two forms of shareholding are analyzed: direct and indirect. Direct shareholders are those who own shares in the public company itself. We consider all shareholders with 5% or more of the voting capital. This is because 5% is the threshold for mandatory identification of shareholders in Brazil. Indirect shareholding represents stockholders who ultimately own the company.
We analyze both control (voting shares) and cash flow rights (voting and non-voting shares). The computation of the ultimate control ownership uses the weakest link method commonly employed in the literature (La Porta et al. (2000 Porta et al. ( , 2002 and Claessens et al. (2000) ). For example, if a shareholder has 80% of the total capital of company B that owns 90% of the total capital of company A, the shareholder ultimately owns 72% of the total capital of company A (80% times 90%). Assuming that all shares have equal voting rights, the shareholder controls 80% of company A (the minimum between 80% and 90%).
The shareholding composition is analyzed backwards until we are able to classify the ultimate owners into one of the following groups: individuals or families, institutional investors (banks, insurance companies, pension funds, foundations or mutual funds), foreigners and the government. Data on the shareholding structure come from the Infoinvest database, while the market and accounting information comes from the Economatica database.
We use Tobin's Q in order to analyze the relation between the ownership structure and firm valuation. Tobin's Q has been employed in the literature to measure the discount in market values resulting from expropriation (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), La Porta et al. (2002)). It is constructed as the market value of assets divided by the replacement cost of assets. An estimate of the numerator of Tobin's Q is the book value of assets minus the book value of common equity plus the market value of common equity. The denominator is the book value of assets 1 . We also use the return on assets (ROA), the ratio of operating income to total assets, as a proxy for performance. where VotDir is the percentage of voting capital owned directly by the largest shareholder, TotDir is the percentage of total (voting and non-voting) capital owned directly by the largest shareholder, Vot/TotDir is the ratio of voting to total capital owned directly by the largest shareholder, VotInd is the percentage of voting capital owned indirectly by the largest shareholder, TotInd is the percentage of total capital owned indirectly by the largest shareholder, Vot/TotInd is the ratio of voting to total capital owned indirectly by the largest shareholder, Foreign is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the largest ultimate shareholder is a foreign investor, Government is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the largest ultimate shareholder is the government, Institutional is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the largest ultimate shareholder is an institution investor, Others is a set of firm-specific control variables such as industry, firm size, volatility, growth, and ε is an error term. The description of each variable can be found in Table 1 .
- Table 2 reports the summary statistics of our sample. The average (median) Tobin´s Q is 0.99 (0.92), ranging from 0.07 to 4.77, while the mean ROA is 11.33%, ranging from -27.17% to 38.10%. There is a high degree of concentration of capital. On average, one large shareholder controls directly more than 70% of the votes. Not surprisingly, the voting rights differ substantially from cash flow rights. Most companies are family-owned. However the opening process of the Brazilian economy and mass privatizations in the 90's enabled the entrance of foreign and institutional investors. We can also note that Brazilian firms are highly volatile (average annual volatility of 83%), and present high annual growth of sales (23% on average).
Results
----------------- Table 2 ----------------- Table 3 shows the ownership and control structure of Brazilian companies. Our results reveal that the largest shareholder controls directly an average of 71% of the voting capital. We also can note that there is a huge difference between the percentage of voting and total capital held by large shareholders. The controlling shareholder has on average 71% of the votes but only 51% of the total capital. Considering the five largest shareholders, these investors have 86% of the voting capital but only 64% of the total capital. The average voting to total capital ratio by the controlling shareholder is 1.69, indicating a huge departure from the one shareone vote rule.
----------------- Table 3 -----------------The stake owned directly by the controlling shareholders is generally higher than that owned indirectly. However, the voting to total capital ratio is higher indirectly than directly. These results indicate that indirect (pyramidal) structures are largely used to maintain control with reduced overall investment in the company, making the disparity from the one share-one vote rule become even greater. Table 4 shows the indirect ownership characteristics according to the type of the controlling shareholder (families, foreigners, government, and institutions). Most companies (58%) are controlled by families, followed by foreigners (25%), institutions (9%), and the government (8%). Family-owned firms tend to have the highest voting to total capital ratio (3.13), while the government-owned firms presents the lowest departure from the one share-one vote rule (1.75). Foreign-owned firms seem to have the highest valuation and performance (1.08 and 15.44%, respectively). In contrast, government-owned firms present the lowest Tobin's Q (0.84) and ROA (8.55%).
----------------- Table 4 ----------------- Table 5 reports the results of four different specifications of regressions for each dependend variable (Tobin's Q and ROA). Regressions I, II, V, and VI include the controlling shareholder's direct stake of capital, while Regressions III, IV, VII, and VIII consider the controlling shareholder's indirect stake of capital, ----------------- Table 5 -
----------------
The coefficients for VotDir and VotInd are negative and statistically significant at the 5% and 10% levels in all specifications. The coefficients for TotDir and TotInd are positive but not statistically significant, while the coefficients for Vot/TotDir and Vot/TotInd are negative and not statistically significant.
These results provide evidence that firm valuation and performance are negatively related to voting concentration. In contrast, the relation between ownership concentration, separation of ownership and control, firm valuation and performance does not seem to be statistically significant.
It is also clear from Table 5 that firm performance is relatively higher in foreign-owned firms. On the other hand, firms controlled by the government generally have significantly lower valuation and performance when compared to other companies. This is consistent with the fact that family-owned firms have the highest voting to total capital ratio (see Table 4 ), suggesting a lower market valuation due to a potential minority shareholder expropriation.
Conclusion
This paper investigates the relation between the ownership structure, valuation and performance of Brazilian companies. The results show that large shareholders keep control while holding only a small fraction of cash flow rights. The evidence also indicates that non-voting shares and pyramiding are the main devices set to entrench the large controlling shareholder. The disparity from the one share-one vote rule becomes even greater through the use of indirect control structures.
There is evidence that firm valuation and performance are negatively related to voting concentration. In contrast, the relation between ownership concentration, separation of ownership and control, firm valuation and performance does not seem to be statistically significant.
Firm performance is relatively higher in foreignowned firms. Family-owned firms are most common in Brazil, and generally have the highest disparity from the one share-one vote and significantly lower valuation and performance when compared to companies controlled by the government, foreign and institutional investors. This is consistent with the fact that family-owned firms have the highest voting to total capital ratio, suggesting a lower market valuation due to a potential minority shareholder expropriation. The numerator of Tobin's Q is the book value of assets minus the book value of common equity plus the market value of common equity, while the denominator is the book value of assets. ROA Return on assets measured by the ratio of operating income to total assets at year-end. VotDir
Appendices
Percentage of voting capital owned directly by the largest shareholder. TotDir
Percentage of total capital owned directly by the largest shareholder. Vot/TotDir
Ratio of voting to total capital owned directly by the largest shareholder. VotInd
Percentage of voting capital owned indirectly by the largest shareholder. TotInd
Percentage of total capital owned indirectly by the largest shareholder. Vot/TotInd
Ratio of voting to total capital owned indirectly by the largest shareholder. Foreign Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the largest ultimate shareholder is a foreign investor. Government Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the largest ultimate shareholder is the government. Institutional Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the largest ultimate shareholder is an institution (banks, insurance companies, pension funds, foundations or mutual funds). Size Firm size measured by the natural logarithm of book value of total assets at year-end. Volatility Annualized standard deviation of daily stock prices from the previous 12 months. Growth Average annual growth of sales over the past 3 years. The dependent variables in each regression are the Tobin's Q, and return on assets (ROA). All coefficients are obtained by estimating linear regression models. Definitions for each of the variables can be found in Table 1 
